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Oil rents and economic growth in oil-abundant MENA countries: 
Governance is the trump card to escape the resource trap 
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Abstract 
The present paper aims, on the one hand, to test the impact of oil rents on economic growth and 
examine the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant MENA 
countries, and on the other hand, to investigate the role of governance in avoiding the resource 
curse and turning oil rents into a tool for economic diversification in 11 MENA oil exporters 
(Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014, by using pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects 
and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The main findings indicate that MENA 
oil exporters’ growth is greatly and positively influenced by oil rents. Likewise, these 
economies have been diagnosed with resource curse. The results also show that governance is 
a key ingredient in the diversification recipe, while, oil rents frustrate economic diversification 
by encouraging rent-seeking activities. The multiplicative interaction term between governance 
index and oil rents indicates that the combined effect of these two variables is effective in 
promoting diversification. In a nutshell, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’ good 
governance capabilities is the way out of the resource curse because it can turn oil wealth into 
a boon and  offer these oil-abundant countries more opportunities for economic diversification 
and thereby can enable them to generate robust and sustainable economic growth. 
Keywords: Oil Rents; Economic Growth; Resource Curse; Governance; Oil-abundant MENA 
countries 
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1. Introduction  
The governance-natural resources nexus has been intensely debated in recent decades, 
and many economists have highlighted the intrinsic role played by institutions and good 
governance practices in escaping the resource curse and reversing it (Barro 1991; Sachs-
Warner, 1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Robinson et al, 2006). According to Elbra (2013) the resource curse can be perceived as “the 
paradox by which mineral-rich states fail to keep pace, economically, with their non-mineral-
rich peers”; this anathema depicts the case where an abundance of natural resources does not 
enable many countries to achieve high sustainable growth rates and poverty reduction goals 
(Costa and Santos, 2013). Also, the resource curse phenomenon is often associated with 
pervasive corruption, a lack of secure property rights, persistent high unemployment and glaring 
income inequalities (Colgan, 2014). Sachs and Warner (1999) asserted that resource-rich 
countries suffer from weak performing manufacturing sectors compared to resource-poor 
countries, because resource rents swallow economic agents’ saliva and entice them to engage 
in rent-seeking activities, breaking the backbone of economic growth. 
 Institutional frailty is a troubling truth behind the synchronization between resource 
abundance and the vicious circle of unsustainable growth, because it ensures that resource rents 
will be misguided and misused in unproductive rather than in productive directions. Moreover, 
Alexeev and Conrad (2011) claimed that the overdependence on natural resource rents carries 
harmful effects for the resource-rich country’s institutional context, and these effects can persist 
for a long time, thus threatening long-term economic growth; this situation is perhaps common 
to many resource-abundant transition countries that have experienced significant institutional 
changes; and to make bad matters worse, point-source natural resource endowment often 
hampers government’s willingness to proceed with necessary institutional reforms and hence 
increasing signs of growth unsustainability. 
Indeed, many historical facts have explored that resource-poor countries tend to grow 
faster than resource-abundant countries; it's also worth bearing in mind that natural resource 
wealth was not the main driving force behind the countries’ economic success in the past. 
Despite abundant natural resources, Norway and Botswana have harnessed their natural 
resource windfalls to generate robust growth rates, and their experiences serve as good lessons 
to natural resource-endowed countries (Larsen, 2005; Holden, 2013). The Norwegian 
government has isolated oil rents from politically-induced goals by allocating them to 
productive investments under a transparent operational framework (Tsani, 2013). Similarly, 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) pointed out that Botswana has successfully managed its natural resource 
rents due to its sound governance practices and high-quality institutions especially in terms of 
property rights that have hitherto been mainly influenced by pre-colonial institutions. This 
shows the wisdom of insisting first and foremost on stepping up institutional reforms and 
building up good governance that is the way out of the resource curse owing to its ability to 
turn natural resource wealth into a boon and enable resource-abundant countries to generate 
robust and sustainable economic growth. But what we’ll see if we change the viewing angle 
and turn the spyglass towards oil-abundant MENA countries? 
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In fact, MENA oil exporters, heavily dependent on oil export revenues, are vulnerable to 
the triple whammy of falling oil prices, expenditure cutback and sluggish growth. If oil prices 
stay low and remain in the dumps, then these countries are expected to post stinging losses in 
oil royalties. This situation, combined with unchanged spending, will cause the budget surplus 
in some countries to dwindle, and of course other countries, especially those with insufficient 
buffers, will not be denied a galloping budget deficit. Actually, the need for setting up 
precautionary buffers to cope with oil price volatility and deal with emergencies has long been 
felt, but even substantial buffers can be fully exhausted if oil prices continue to slide. 
Unfortunately, besides the looming problem of the resource curse, the plunge in oil prices may 
not leave policy makers elbow room for maneuver, and this could be the straw that breaks the 
camel's back. The deep roots of today's emergency situation can be revealed with a glance back 
at these countries’ governance and institutional tissue. This paper thus aims to unearth very 
interesting and research-worthy aspects of this intractable situation by testing, on the one hand, 
the impact of oil rents on economic growth and examine the main symptoms of the resource 
curse phenomenon in oil-abundant MENA countries, and, on the other hand, by investigating 
the role of governance in avoiding the resource curse and turning oil rents into a tool for 
economic diversification in 11 MENA oil exporters (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-
2014. Therefore, the paper is divided into five sections. After introducing the topic in section 
1, section 2 presents the theoretical background and empirical indicia relating to the triptych 
resource curse-good governance-economic growth, section 3 discusses oil rents, economic 
growth and good governance in oil-abundant MENA countries, section 4 introduces the data, 
explains the methodology, and analyzes the empirical results and finally section 5 concludes 
the paper and draws some policy implications. 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Review on Resource Curse and Good 
Governance and the Links with Economic Growth 
A- The Resource Curse: Implications and a Glance at Successful Experiences 
The resource curse reflects the case where natural resource wealth is associated with poor 
economic performance (Bjorvatn et al., 2012). In a nutshell, the following are the main 
symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon: (1) the exaggerated reliance on natural resources; 
(2) the frustrating effect of real exchange rate appreciation, resulting from natural resource 
exports, on other economic sectors; (3) the short-term rise in inflation; (4) the commensurate 
fall in consumption in response to high commodity prices; (5) the inefficient control over public 
spending; (6) the pervasiveness of corruption (Costa and Santos, 2013).  
As a matter of fact, natural resource rents are often used to fuel government spending on 
infrastructure, telecommunication, health care and educational services; thus, they can promote 
economic growth, but the puzzling fact is that the impact of those rents remains positive, then 
after a certain threshold it turns negative, especially under institutional deficiencies (Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh, 2004; Mehrara, 2009). It is widely held among economists that resource rents can 
switch entrepreneurs’ interest from productive endeavors to rent-seeking activities and hence 
economic growth will be severely hampered (Bjorvatn et al., 2012). Further, natural resource 
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abundance can cause structural distortions which may have a growth-reducing impact (Bjorvatn 
and Farzanegan, 2013). Large-scale resource extraction activities can lead to higher real wages 
and real exchange rate appreciation, hindering competitiveness and production in non-resource 
sectors (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Also, the resource abundance may lead to low levels of 
human development and high levels of poverty and inequality by inducing governments to 
swerve aside from welfare-enhancing policies (Al-Kasim et al., 2013). As well as, the 
overwhelming reliance on natural resources generates a poor institutional framework and 
market failure which in turn further dampen the economy’s growth potential (Boyce and Emery, 
2011).  
Sachs and Warner (1995) indicated that natural resource-endowed countries tend to grow 
slower than resource-poor countries. But actually natural resource-abundant countries like 
Norway and Botswana are often cited as successful examples of harnessing natural resource 
wealth for economic growth. In fact, the Norwegian government has skillfully managed its oil 
revenues, owing to its belief that the oil wealth belongs to the whole country and it should be 
wisely used to benefit the entire population. Norway was keen to involve national oil companies 
in the petroleum industry, because ensuring that natural resources are extracted by national 
companies is the major stride towards the resource blessing (Pomfret, 2012). Further, oil rents 
were invested abroad through the Government Pension Fund. Importantly, the Norwegian 
companies have entered national and international capital markets, thus securing sufficient 
funding for profitable investments and it is worthwhile to note that democracy and stability 
have arisen in Norway before the discovery of oil; also, the institutional basis has long been 
supported by the well-functioning bureaucracy, low levels of corruption, and law enforcement 
(Holden, 2013). Likewise, Acemoglu et al. (2003) indicated that Botswana has successfully 
managed to escape the resource curse through enforcing property rights, providing checks and 
balances on the executive power, and facilitating infrastructure investment. By contrast, 
surrounding resource-rich nations like Angola, Sierra Leone and Congo plagued by poor 
institutional quality have had struggling economies. As a matter of fact, many oil-exporting 
developing countries fail to generate sustained economic growth, and this may be partly 
explained by the fact that the oil sector leaves no room for investing in the other non-oil sectors 
(Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). 
B- The Natural Resource Trap: How Much Do Governance and Institutions Matter?  
Bjorvatn et al. (2012) asserted that the massive rent-seeking behavior associated with 
resource endowment can cause a pallid growth, and even more it can trigger a lengthy period 
of political unrest. Further, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) pointed out that the resource wealth often 
causes a dysfunctional behavior, especially in a prosaic institutional structure. In point of fact, 
uncertainty, political strife and economic recession may result when greedy elites exploit 
natural resources ruthlessly for their own self-interests, ignoring the public interest (Jayakar 
and Martin, 2012). To make matters worse, resource-endowed countries may use resource rents 
to put out the fire of potential internal conflicts and buy peace, and it is worthwhile to note that 
the resource abundance helps sustain bad political regimes and undermine any transition to 
democracy (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). However, resource-rich countries with good 
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institutions designed for conflict prevention and stability maintenance are, therefore, less 
vulnerable to such dire situations that not only exacerbate the resource curse but also make 
political and economic bombs that can explode at any moment  (James and Aadland, 2011).  
In the same vein, Kolstad and Søreide (2009) emphasized that corruption is the underlying 
force behind the poor economic performance of resource-rich countries. Additionally, the 
corrupt behavior stemmed from increasing resource rents encourages individuals to seek a piece 
of the resource pie instead of engaging in productive activities. Also, corruption persuades 
politicians to stay in power, causing a tremendous lack of accountability, inefficient allocation 
of public funds and serious distortions in the economy.  More precisely, power-hungry 
governors in resource-rich countries take advantage as much as possible and keep themselves 
engaged in corrupt conduct and wasteful rent-seeking behavior, thus they deprive their 
economies of prosperity (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). For instance, countries endowed with 
substantial natural resources may regard trade liberalization as superfluous under harsh 
environments plagued by institutional deficiencies and corruption (James and Aadland, 2011). 
Undoubtedly, corruption and political conflict resulting from resource abundance make policy 
makers less inclined to uphold the country’s economy and induce them to deliver low quality 
public goods and services, and ignore citizens' needs (Neumayer, 2004; Cavalcanti et al., 2011). 
Moreover, natural resource-endowed countries’ ruling elites tend to build an institutional 
tissue that enables them to seize resource rents, they also inhibit democratic accountability and 
make no effort to improve institutions that regulate private sector activities, affect the relative 
profitability of productive activities, and curb rent-seeking activities (Ross, 2001; Kolstad and 
Søreide, 2009). In general, poor institutional quality induces politicians' tendency towards the 
inefficient use of resource rents to pursue their electoral goals (Robinson et al., 2006). In 
contrast, a strong institutional basis can preserve resource-rich countries from the ravenous 
behavior of politicians and bureaucrats (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). In fact, the impact of 
natural resource booms counts on political institutions which can hold politicians accountable 
and enable countries to reap the benefits of their resource wealth (Robinson et al., 2006). In 
addition, transparency helps counteract the bane of natural resource richness (Oskenbayev et 
al., 2013). Similarly, Stevens and Dietsche (2008) emphasized that transparency can safeguard 
sound public finances, build citizens’ trust in their governments, and enhance government’s 
credibility and accountability. Thus, the lack of transparency can severely exacerbate resource 
curse problems and undermine economic growth. Admittedly, ample research evidence 
confirms that the institutional improvement helps escaping the pitfalls of the resource curse; 
therefore, countries suffering from this damn should increase their protection of property rights 
and enforce vigorous anti-corruption policies and procedures (Costa and Santos, 2013).  
It can be concluded that natural resources are not the only driving force behind the 
resource curse but also low-quality institutions dampen economic growth and make matters 
worse (Boschini et al., 2013). Thus, the problem lies not in the resource abundance, but in the 
way of managing resource rents, and the ability of policy makers to establish the appropriate 
institutional structure and implement growth-promoting policies (Cavalcanti et al., 2011). 
Indeed, low levels of corruption, solid rule of law and robust democratic institutions can ensure 
prudent management of windfall gains from natural resources and improve fiscal performance 
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and hence foster economic growth (El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013). As well as, natural 
resource-endowed countries must change track to ride the wave of prosperity by focusing on 
economic diversification that can broaden their economic base and provide insulation from the 
resource curse (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Wiig and Kolstad, 2012). 
C- Diversification: A Way Out of The Resource Curse, But What About The Main 
Binding Constraints Facing This Process? 
Economic diversification is a better shield against the resource curse by widening the 
country's economic base in a way that progressively delinks economic growth from resource 
abundance. In fact, diversification highlights differences in growth patterns between resource-
rich countries and those poorly endowed with natural resources (Parlee, 2015); it also means 
that the economic growth is drawn from more than one sector, and it can take place within a 
specific sector or it can simply reduce the extent of concentration across sectors (Wiig and 
Kolstad, 2012). Chile, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Sweden, for example, explain 
how some resource-rich countries were able to find ways to reduce their resource dependency 
and successfully diversify their economies and why they have done better than others in terms 
of maintaining sound economic growth (Joya, 2015). 
Economic diversification is a pillar of sustainable economic growth, it is the process by 
which resource-rich countries counteract instability and escape the worldwide slump in 
resource prices. Furthermore, diversification has the ability to solve the unemployment problem 
and point institutions in the right direction, and hence, it is a cornerstone of the peacebuilding 
process. Since it is evident that diversification entails substantial benefits in many crucial ways, 
the following question immediately comes to mind: why don't oil-abundant countries diversify 
more?, there are many reasons for this, such as the lack of clear guidelines on diversification, 
the entire support to heavily energy-dependent industries, the inadequate support to non-oil 
sectors, and the private sector's dependence on government spending (Albassam, 2015). Omgba 
(2014) claimed that export diversification is greatly and positively influenced by the time period 
elapsing between oil production starting date and independence date, for example older oil-
producing countries will have had enough time to diversify their export bases, as compared to 
those that recently started exporting oil. Perhaps the answer is hovering around political 
interests; in other words, the diversification process can pose a sufficiently serious threat to the 
incumbent's hold on power which in turn can make any potential economic benefits too small 
to be seen with the naked eye, because garnering and maintaining political power already 
ensures retaining gains. Actually, the ruling elite’s satisfaction with available sources of income 
is strong enough to keep the doors locked in front of diversification strategies especially those 
that exert a menace over the seats of power. A further implication, here, is that even if a process 
of diversification has been taking place, then it will be more skewed towards political payoffs 
at the expense of societal ones. This explains why the implementation of genuine diversification 
policies has failed to bear fruit in many resource-rich developing countries (Wiig and Kolstad, 
2012). 
Moreover, the pace of diversification is greater in resource-poor countries where 
colonizers created settlement colonies and brought with them good institutions, than in 
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resource-rich countries where settlers set up extractive colonies, in which institutions were 
ideally designed to effectively extract resources, it's also worth bearing in mind that these 
institutions persisted after independence due to the ruling elite's goals and worries (Acemoglu 
et al., 2001). Indeed, the better the resource-rich countries’ institutional quality is, the more 
likely these countries’ economic base will be diversified. Diversification depends greatly on 
resource-rich countries’ institutional quality, or more simply put, good quality institutions offer 
resource-abundant countries more opportunities for export basket diversification, and give them 
much greater immunity to export concentration and resource trap. Additionally, diversification 
requires reducing the tax burden on non-oil sectors and waiving trade restrictions biased 
towards oil products (Wiig and Kolstad, 2012). Further, resource rents can serve as productive 
assets, contributing to economic diversification, which in turn can offer an easy way out of the 
resource curse dilemma by efficiently allocating resources to their most productive uses (Joya, 
2015), and it is also important to emphasize here the leading role played by education in 
enabling and empowering people, strengthening their own capacities and making them aware 
that their actions are of paramount importance in supporting the country's economic 
diversification. In general, achieving diversification requires a burning desire instead of 
dreading the cost of the process. Obviously, the first step in embarking on promising 
diversification processes is to build a thoughtful and measurable plan with realistic, clearly 
defined, and action-oriented goals, and it's worth mentioning that this plan should be executable 
(Albassam, 2015). 
D- The Triptych Good Governance-Diversification-Economic Growth: Is Natural 
Resource Wealth a Boon or a Bane?  
The interaction between natural resource revenues and prosaic forms of governance can 
render resource-rich countries financially underdeveloped, and lead to imprudent fiscal and 
monetary policies, weakening the foundation on which economic diversification and 
sustainable growth build (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2014; Weinthal and Luong, 2006). 
Additionally, the shift from productive activities to rent-seeking activities lies on the activity’s 
profitability, which in turn requires an efficient business environment supported by good 
governance (Omgba, 2015). According to Karshenas and Hakimian (2005) export 
diversification is driven by both domestic and foreign private investment that is responsive to 
the quality of institutions. Likewise, human capital development is a key ingredient in the 
diversification recipe that requires more than the existing human capital used in the easy oil-
growth, this capital can grow only within a proper institutional framework that reduces the 
magnetic coupling between resource rents and corrupt practices, because this dangerous 
explosive mixture is the arch-enemy of human capital development in resource-abundant 
countries, thus, along with human capital development, diversification can make a giant and 
constructive stride forward in widening the doors of employment opportunities, thereby 
enhancing growth prospects (Al-Rawashdeh et al, 2013). While, poor governance contributes 
appreciably to the depletion and degradation of natural resources, instead of spending them to 
lay the basis for economic diversification and sustainable growth. In fact, the building up of 
powerful institutions is the only mediator that can reconcile the twin goals of diversifying 
economic activity and yielding benefits from natural resource endowment. Admittedly, good 
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governance practices cannot only pressure governments to use resource wealth wisely in paving 
the way for fledgling sectors, but also create and maintain a healthy business climate in which 
these sectors can flourish and make significant contributions to national economies 
(OECD/United Nations, 2011). 
The successful injection of governance into the field of the resource curse has led Iimi 
(2007) to conclude that most governance indicators that influence economic diversification to 
allow for a sustainable growth path are as follows: First, voice and accountability does a lot to 
prevent resource-rent dissipation, especially by monitoring those in authority and holding them 
accountable, hence the diversification process can be initiated and guided by the pursuit of the 
public interest. Second, government effectiveness enhances the ability of civil servants to 
deliver quality public services and requires them to understand their responsibilities, develop 
new competences, and implement good resource management policies according to the growth 
and diversification requirements. Third, the absence of regulatory quality makes it easier for 
the government to pursue market-unfriendly policies and impose excessive and onerous 
regulatory burdens, thus hindering natural resource development and frustrating diversification 
by leaving the resource sector bleeding in public hands. Fourth, control of corruption reflects 
the effective implementation of anticorruption policies that are crucial for clear, transparent, 
non-discriminatory distribution of resource benefits, and that tend to be conducive to adopt 
appropriate resource management practices and hence they can best serve the diversification 
process and help resource-rich countries to attain sustainable economic growth. Further, the 
presence of extensive and vigorous anti-corruption policies curtails the ruling elite's attempt to 
use resources and act in their own best and narrow interests rather than in the interests of the 
people (Iimi, 2007). In a nutshell, these four pillars support a diversification away from over-
reliance on natural resources and seem to transform resource wealth in a way that can generate 
stable and sustainable growth rates, or more aptly put, governance framework determines 
whether the resource abundance turns out to be a boon or a bane for natural resource-abundant 
countries.  
The impact of oil rents on economic growth and the role of governance in avoiding the 
resource curse have received a great deal of attention from economists over the last decades, 
and the table below summarizes the main empirical studies that have been conducted to examine 
these relationships: 
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Table 1. Empirical Evidence on the Link between Resource Curse, Institutional Quality 
and Economic Growth 
Authors Sample Empirical 
approach 
Results 
Bulte et al., (2005) 
 
90 countries 
1970-2001 
 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
The resource abundance 
negatively affects institutions 
concerned with government 
effectiveness and rule of law. 
Bhattacharyya 
and Hodler (2010) 
 
124 countries 
1980-2004  
 
Game-Theoretic 
Model 
 
The link between resource rents 
and corruption counts on the 
quality of democratic 
institutions. 
Tsani (2013) 
 
27 natural resource-
rich countries  
1996-2007    
OLS, Newey-
West standard 
errors, Panel 
Corrected 
Standard Errors 
(PCSE) 
Poor institutional quality 
aggravates the tendency for 
resource dependence. 
 
Libman (2013) 
 
72 Russian regions 
2000-2006 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
Good institutional quality is the 
main driving force behind the 
positive effect of natural 
resources on growth rates. 
Oskenbayev et al., 
(2013) 
 
Kazakhstan 
2001-2009 
2SLS model, 
GMM method 
 
Resource abundance is often 
associated with corrupt 
practices and weak institutions. 
Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004) 
 
47 countries  
1975-1996 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
Corruption appears to 
significantly dampen economic 
growth. 
Andersen and 
Aslaksen (2008) 
 
90 countries 
1970-1990, 1990-2000 
 
LAD regression 
and reweighted 
least squares, 
OLS 
 
-Rule of law exerts a significant 
positive impact on economic 
growth. 
-Resource abundance has a 
significant negative influence 
on economic growth. 
Brunnschweiler 
(2008) 
 
100 countries 
1996-2000 
 
OLS regressions, 
two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) 
estimations 
There is a significant positive 
relationship between 
institutional quality and 
economic growth. 
More precisely, rule of law and 
government effectiveness 
substantially raise the rate of 
economic growth. 
Torvik (2009) 
 
87 countries 
1972-2000 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
Institutional quality displays a 
positive and significant effect 
on economic growth. 
Mehrara (2009) 
 
13 oil-exporting 
countries 
1965-2005  
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
A sound institutional 
environment has a salient 
positive influence on economic 
growth. 
Alexeev and 
Conrad (2011) 
 
CIS countries  
1996-2005 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression,  
Control of corruption has a 
positive and statistically 
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two-stage least 
squares  (2SLS) 
regression 
 
significant impact on economic 
growth. 
Boschini et al., 
(2013) 
 
90-107 countries 
1965-2005 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
Good institutional quality is a 
prerequisite for economic 
growth. 
 
Iqbal and Daly 
(2014) 
 
52 
developing/transitional 
economies 
1996-2010 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
 
Control of corruption exhibits a 
positive but 
statistically insignificant impact 
on economic growth. 
 
Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003)  
91 countries 
1980-1995 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
Resource-rich countries with 
good quality institutions attract 
more investments. 
 
Nili and Rastad 
(2007) 
 
12 oil economies, 78 
non-oil countries 
1960-2001 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
Weak financial institutions 
seem to affect economic growth 
negatively. 
 
Carmignani 
(2013) 
 
84 countries  
1970-2010 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
High-quality institutions 
promote human development 
through reducing income 
inequality. 
 
Hooshmand et al., 
(2013) 
 
17 countries  
2002- 2010 
 
System-GMM 
(SGMM) 
dynamic panel 
 
Good governance has a positive 
and statistically significant 
influence on financial 
development. 
 
James and 
Aadland (2011) 
 
3092 counties in the 
United States 
1980-1995 
 
Two-stage 
generalized least 
squares (GLS), 
OLS 
Natural resource abundance 
tends to reduce real income per 
capita. 
 
Boyce and Emery 
(2011) 
50 U.S. states 
1970–2001 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(OLS) regression 
Resource abundance displays a 
negative impact on economic 
growth. 
 
Bjorvatn and 
Farzanegan 
(2013) 
 
120 countries 
1982-2006 
 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
(GMM), OLS 
regression 
 
Resource rents crowd out the 
manufacturing sector and lead 
to lower real GDP per capita.  
El Anshasy and 
Katsaiti (2013) 
 
32 resource-abundant 
countries and 47 non-
resource countries 
1984-2008 
OLS regression, 
2SLS model 
Good governance, stronger 
democratic institutions, and low 
levels of corruption 
significantly enhance economic 
growth. 
Source: Constructed By Authors 
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3. Oil Rents, Economic Growth and Good Governance in Oil-Abundant 
MENA Countries 
3.1. Oil Rents and Challenges Confronting Oil-Abundant MENA Countries 
Figure 1. The Real Price of Crude Oil ($/barrel), 1996-2016. 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics database, the data are 
available online at http://www.eia.gov (accessed 22/01/2016). 
After reaching a peak of $147 per barrel in July 2008, oil prices sagged below $40 a barrel 
at the beginning of 2009, thus restraining oil production and making GCC countries swallow 
the bitterness of the crisis (IMF, 2009). Following the recovery in oil prices, MENA oil 
exporters’ export earnings, fiscal and external balances began to improve during 2010-2011. 
However, oil GDP growth rates have remained below pre-crisis peaks, crude oil production 
also remained at significantly lower levels than before the crisis (IMF, 2010). Despite MENA 
oil exporters' steadfastness in the face of the devastating impact of the global financial crisis, 
these governments are still floundering in the waves stemming from oil dependency. In fact, 
the significant shrinking of GCC countries’ considerable fiscal space has generated concerns 
about these countries’ ability to carry out counter-cyclical policy to contain the mounting risk 
of falling oil prices (IMF, 2013).  
Oil prices dropped sharply by $60 to less than $50 a barrel in January 2015 compared to 
July 2014. MENA oil exporters’ landscape punctuated by drastic declines in oil export revenues 
that reached $360 billion in 2015, has underlined the collapse in these countries’ external 
surpluses. In fact, the GCC's current-account surplus swung to a deficit of 0.25 percent of GDP 
in 2015, while non-GCC oil exporters posted a current account deficit of 8¾ percent of GDP in 
2015 (IMF, 2015). If oil prices stay low and remain in the dumps, then GCC countries are 
expected to post stinging losses in oil royalties. This situation, combined with unchanged 
spending, will cause the budget surplus in Kuwait and Qatar to dwindle, and will promptly turn 
the fiscal surplus in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman into a very large deficit, and of course 
Bahrain will not be denied a galloping budget deficit (Mottaghi, 2015). 
The plunge in oil prices has been driven not just by supply-side forces but also by the 
expansion of shale oil production, OPEC's decision to defend its share of the global oil market, 
and the expected relief of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran that could revive Iranian oil exports. 
Given persistently lackluster global growth, China's slowing growth trajectory and the resulting 
decline in global demand for oil, it is not surprising that oil prices have been driven sharply 
lower (Husain et al., 2015). 
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Figure 2. Oil Rents (% of GDP) in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries, 1996-2014. 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, the data are available online at: http://data.worldbank.org 
(accessed 22/01/2016). 
MENA oil exporters, heavily dependent on oil export revenues, are vulnerable to the triple 
whammy of falling oil prices, expenditure cutback and sluggish growth. Indeed, falling oil 
prices urge these governments to acclimate to the new situation by abruptly adjusting their 
expenditure and revenue policies in order to achieve fiscal sustainability, safeguard 
intergenerational equity, and leave policy makers more elbow room for maneuver. It's worth 
mentioning that MENA oil-rich countries are not yet saving enough oil wealth for succeeding 
generations (IMF, 2015). 
Actually, the need for setting up precautionary buffers to cope with oil price volatility and 
deal with emergencies has long been felt. Large buffers can allow for more reasonable and 
gradual spending adjustment and mitigate the downward pressure that low oil prices exert on 
economic growth, but even substantial buffers can be fully exhausted if oil prices continue to 
slide. In contrast, countries with insufficient buffers need to urgently adjust their spending, 
taking due account of their cyclical situation. It's also worth bearing in mind that the 
composition of fiscal adjustment that matters most in avoiding future bottlenecks reveals a 
strong tilt toward retrenching, to some extent, current spending, while maintaining high-return 
public capital expenditures and priority social spending (IMF, 2015). 
3.2. Economic Growth in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries 
Figure 3. Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (percent change) in Oil-Abundant 
MENA Countries, 1996-2016. 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, the data are available online at: http://www.imf.org/ 
(accessed 22/01/2016). 
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MENA oil exporters' growth is expected to drop by 0.25-0.5 percentage point in 2016 and 
fall sharply by 0.5-0.75 percentage point for the 2017–2018 period (IMF, 2015). Indeed, GCC 
countries’ growth averaged 4.5 percent in 2014-2015 (IMF, 2014). GCC's non-oil growth is 
expected to slow slightly to just below 4 percent for both 2015 and 2016 after reaching an 
estimated 5.75 percent in 2014, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Further, ongoing fiscal 
consolidation efforts are projected to exert some downward pressure on GCC countries' GDP 
growth in the short term (IMF, 2015). While, growth in non-GCC oil exporters is projected to 
stay approximately flat in 2015 after growing by nearly 1.75 percent in 2014, noting that non-
oil sectors in Iraq and Libya are still extremely vulnerable to ongoing internal strife (IMF, 
2015). Regarding the lifting of sanctions against Iran and assumed improvements in the region’s 
security situation, non-GCC growth is projected to pick up to 5 percent in 2016 and beyond 
(IMF, 2015). 
It is recognized that these growth projections are however subject to many large 
uncertainties, notably those related to the future trajectory of global petroleum prices and 
emerging-market economies’ growth prospects, since the recent plunge in oil prices and the 
envisaged fiscal adjustment can create a bleak and pessimistic view of MENA oil exporters' 
growth paths (IMF, 2015). In fact, the situation in Algeria and Iraq threatens to deteriorate 
further, because these countries have failed to contain macro-financial risks posed by heavy 
reliance on oil-related bank deposits, and credit exposure to state-owned companies whose 
existence hinges mainly on oil rents. Simultaneously, the banking sector's situation is no better 
in Yemen, due to its exposure to sovereign risk and the curse that has befallen the country's 
fiscal indicators (IMF, 2015). 
It should be stressed at the outset, however, that massive GCC's infrastructure 
development continues at a robust pace, and provides a strong impetus towards a large-scale 
expansion of tourism, construction, and transport, for which these countries' reputation on the 
world stage keeps growing (IMF, 2014). As a matter of fact, the clear differences in economic 
growth between the GCC countries and non-GCC MENA countries have been heightened by 
the political turmoil that has spread across several non-GCC countries (IMF, 2014). Actually, 
protracted conflicts in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, have not only drastically reduced growth rates 
in these countries but also exacerbated the spread of prolonged symptoms to neighboring 
countries. These struggles smashed the region-wide confidence-building process, threatening 
growth prospects (IMF, 2015). Additionally, there are several potential channels through which 
conflicts can influence economic activity. First, conflicts cause large-scale displacements, 
losses in both physical and human capital, a destruction of established trade routes, and massive 
damages to infrastructure and industrial facilities. Second, they engender and fan the flames of 
uncertainty, and thereby undermining conflict-ridden countries' potential growth (IMF, 2015). 
But the bitter truth is that these conflicts hit the poor hardest, since they lead to an increase 
in military expenditures at expense of much-needed social spending (IMF, 2015). 
On the other side, exhausted fiscal buffers will leave MENA oil exporters with no choice 
but to expose the card of public spending cuts in order to fend off the looming crisis, but this 
step entails not only decreased investment spending, but also adverse implications for future 
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growth, especially in countries with paralyzed infrastructure, so a skewed spending towards 
high-return investments is a key priority (IMF, 2015). Moreover, growth slowdown forced 
China to back off its insatiable demand for oil, thus bringing crushing disappointments to 
MENA oil exporters' GDP growth (IMF, 2015). 
A Glance Back at the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 
Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (percent change) in Oil-Abundant 
MENA Countries, 2007-2010. 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, the data are available online at: http://www.imf.org/ 
(accessed 22/01/2016). 
The global financial meltdown has hit all MENA oil exporters (through the sharp decline 
in oil prices, sharp drop in global demand, and abrupt reversals in capital flows), but to varying 
degrees, it has been especially severe in the GCC countries. Oil sector activity has contracted 
sharply in 2009; this alarming decline has led most governments to pursue vigorous counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies which have alleviated the hardship the crisis has brought upon 
the non-oil sector. The crisis has also revealed unsurprising pockets of weakness in the banking 
system, and has urged these governments to undertake unusual measures to cushion the impact 
of the crisis that has been more severe than anticipated (IMF, 2009). However, crude oil 
production has grown in 2010 and 2011 as oil prices have recovered, and world activity has 
also expanded after the global recession of 2008-2009. Hence, oil GDP has picked up between 
3.5 percent and 4.25 percent in 2010-2011, but it is still lower than pre-crisis levels. However, 
MENA oil exporters’ economic activity has recovered in 2010, albeit at a moderate pace (IMF, 
2010). 
The Alarm Bells Are Ringing: The Dire Need for Economic Diversification 
Away from Oil. 
A high level of uncertainty surrounds the long-term prospects for oil futures prices that 
seem to be continuing on the downward path, and there is no sign of improvement in the 
foreseeable future, also the long term outlook remains bearish due to several reasons including 
the following:  the darkening global economic picture, the Eurozone slowdown, the deeper-
than-expected slowdown in China, China’s first step towards less oil-intensive phase of 
development, and the recent lifting of oil sanctions against Iran (Mottaghi, 2015). 
It’s the closing curtain for oil boom; it's the moment of diversification away from oil; it’s 
time for private sector job creation which is a target that MENA oil exporters really want to 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Vol. 18, Issue No. 2, September 2016 
101 
 
make happen, but it seems impossible, given the current security and fiscal situation in the 
region. Notwithstanding some progress has been achieved towards economic diversification, 
blind reliance on oil remains the economic mainstay of MENA oil-exporting economies. 
Indeed, this is exactly what we should expect, if the private sector itself is heavily dependent 
on public expenditure (IMF, 2015). A conventional wisdom says that emphasis on collecting 
non-oil revenues can enhance the flexibility of an economy and increase its ability to respond 
to adverse shocks (IMF, 2014).  
Non-oil GDP growth seems, at first sight, much more closely tied to the oil price growth, 
as the hike in oil prices boosts non-oil GDP growth by rising government spending. In most 
MENA oil-exporting countries, non-oil GDP growth rates are now even more concentrated in 
service industries that depend to a large extent on demand expansion resulted from oil sales, 
and what makes matters worse is that non-oil sectors are poorly equipped to deal with 
plummeting oil prices, so pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies may solidify non-oil GDP 
growth in the medium-term (IMF, 2014). In fact, policies targeted at creating incentives, 
enhancing skills in line with private sector's needs, and improving business climate may seem 
far-fetched, but successful experiences of diversification show that they aren't.  
In light of daunting challenges that lie ahead, IMF (2014) has announced several measures 
that can be adopted to increase diversification, which in turn can better shield MENA oil 
exporters against disruptive oil price shock, these measures include:  
- Enhancing the quality and effectiveness of education and reducing the skills mismatch. 
- Restraining discretionary spending by cutting down the public sector wage bill and 
strengthening the private sector's employment- absorptive capacity. 
- Phasing out energy subsidies that create an investment bias at the expense of labor and less 
energy-intensive sectors. 
- Stepping up strenuous efforts to implement trade facilitation, broaden the region's export base, 
and develop a highly competitive and dynamic business environment. 
- Beefing up security especially in conflict-ridden countries and recovering political stability 
that helps woo FDI into non-resource tradable sectors. 
- Facilitating access to finance and lessening the bureaucratic burden that weighs heavily on 
private entrepreneurship. 
- Enhancing transparency and intensifying anti-corruption efforts. 
- Embarking on higher public infrastructure investment during oil boom periods. 
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3.3. Good Governance in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries 
Figure 5. Governance Index (The Simple Average of Six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators) in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries, 1996-2014. 
 
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, the data are available online at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 22/01/2016). 
In fact, there is a great deal of variability in governance quality across MENA oil-
exporting countries. GCC countries continue to dominate the top tier of good governance 
scores, while non-GCC MENA countries lag behind comparator GCC countries in most, if not 
all, governance indicators. 
Figure 6. Governance Indicators in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries, 1996, 2010, 2014. 
 
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, the data are available online at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 22/01/2016). 
For instance, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen score lowest on political stability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption; these factors are most responsible for 
hamstrung private sector in these countries whose poor ranking is a crucial indication of where 
oil wealth can warp institutions and hinder economic diversification. Without the existence of 
sound governance that creates an appropriate and enabling environment, the private sector-led 
growth can't be sustained or even achieved, like a fish can't live out of the water. This 
governance vacuum makes non-GCC MENA countries more vulnerable to heavy losses in 
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terms of per capita GDP growth (Akhtar, 2009), thus putting dismaying challenges for most 
non-GCC MENA countries, notably those whose economies depend on external assistance or 
foreign aid. 
Poor governance fascinates economic agents and gets them interested in rent-seeking 
activities rather than genuinely productive ones, and this situation has been exacerbated by 
corruption-prone institutions that are spiraling out of control. It’s worthwhile to mention that, 
all non-GCC MENA countries scored low in the Corruption Perception Index of TI, while UAE 
has been adjudged to be the least corrupt country in the region. Additionally, half-way reforms 
have so far failed to forestall the ravages of corruption, triggering instability and making public 
resources a prey by opening the floodgates to powerful political predators, and it will not be 
surprising at all if the next generation becomes a victim. 
Yemen and Iraq, plagued by political instability and terrorist attacks, have been listed as 
the 7th, and 12th most fragile states, respectively, according to the Fragile States Index for 
2015, and they are the MENA region’s most utterly failed states (Fund for Peace, 2015). In light 
of the Arab awakening, it becomes clear that being aware of tyrannical and oppressive actions, 
and demanding more transparency and accountability are the evidence that the current 
economic and political situation descends from the delusive peace, wonky institutional 
framework and misguided governance policies. The Arab spring has unveiled deep-rooted 
governance problems, but there has been very little improvement in the area of good governance 
since then.   
Perhaps it is not surprising that sustaining the status quo is not just a sign of the ceaseless 
triumph of private over public interests, but it may seem rather a stratagem for plundering the 
wealth without much fuss. In fact, public service delivery took a drastic turn for the worse due 
in large part to deeply entrenched governance failures that exerted a colossal drag on public 
investment management (Heidenhof, 2014). 
If we take a closer look, it seems that weak governance and poor public service delivery 
go hand-in-hand. It is of paramount importance to emphasize here the significance of higher 
education to a country's future prospects for good governance. Universities are not only places 
where tomorrow's leaders are born, but they are also places for preparing forceful, effective and 
meaningful civil society participation in the governance process, through injecting the ideas of 
good governance into the minds of today's youth (Mbi and Jaramillo, 2010). In this way, higher 
education feeds the roots of tomorrow's institutions, providing a fertile breeding ground for 
governance prospects. In other words, today's higher education landscape can sculpt the major 
features of tomorrow's good governance. 
The World Bank is taking the lead on laying the groundwork upon which MENA 
countries can build more transparent and credible state institutions, strengthen government 
accountability, support open government policies, and enhance the rule of law. Because the 
World Bank’s support can help these countries overcome several drawbacks that hinder good 
governance and frustrate diversification efforts, such as large and inefficient public sector, 
excessive state centralization, rampant public spending mismanagement,  poor access to 
information, barriers to authentic civic participation, lack of transparency, turning blind eyes 
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on corrupt practices, incongruence between legislation and its implementation (Heidenhof, 
2014). 
It certainly is clear that deeply entrenched governance issues cannot be solved overnight; 
visible and tangible improvements in governance are going to take time, they may sound simple, 
but they require long-term commitment and great efforts on everyone's part, this laborious 
process can bring fruitful results to each country engaged in such endeavor only if it is not 
carried out on a one-size-fits-all basis. As long as these governments sought to borrow ideas 
and successful models that don’t fit their own institutional contexts, interests and needs, the 
achievement of good governance can happen only in dreams and can’t end up coming true. 
4. Data and Empirical Results 
A. Data 
The present paper aims, on the one hand, to test the impact of oil rents on economic 
growth and examine the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant 
MENA countries, and on the other hand, to investigate the role of governance in avoiding the 
resource curse and turning oil rents into a tool for economic diversification in 11 MENA oil 
exporters (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014, this time period has been chosen on the basis 
of data availability for the following variables: 
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %) is used as a proxy for economic growth, from the 
World Development Indicators database. 
OILR: Oil rents (% of GDP) (they represent the difference between the value of crude oil 
production at world prices and total costs of production), from the World Development 
Indicators database. 
AGR: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), from the World Development Indicators database. 
IND: Industry, value added (% of GDP), from the World Development Indicators database. 
SER: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), from the World Development Indicators 
database. 
DIV: The export diversification index indicates whether the export structure of each country or 
country grouping differs from the world patterns, this index takes values between 0 (a high 
degree of diversification) and 1(a low degree of diversification), the data are from UNCTAD's 
database. 
CONC: The export concentration index shows how exports of individual countries or country 
groupings are concentrated on several products or otherwise distributed in a more homogeneous 
manner among a series of products, this index takes values between 0 (minimum concentration) 
and 1 (maximum concentration), the data are from UNCTAD's database. 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Vol. 18, Issue No. 2, September 2016 
105 
 
GI: presents the Governance Index which is constructed as a simple average of the following 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory 
Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Control of Corruption (CC), these indicators range from -2.5 
(bad) to 2.5 (good), the data are from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) database. 
EF: Economic Freedom is used as a proxy for economic institutions, introduced by Heritage 
Foundation and Wall Street Journal, this indicator is graded on a scale of 0 (repressed) to 100 
(free). 
B. Data Analysis Tools 
This paper uses a panel data analysis due to its ability to control the impact of 
heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved), this analysis is also effective in reducing 
degrees of freedom and addressing collinearity problems, thus producing substantially better 
results (Hsiao 2003). Besides using the pooled OLS model, fixed effects model and random 
effects model, the Generalized-Method of-Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), is also employed due to its ability to deal with persistent data, neglected 
endogeneity and heterogeneity issues by using and selecting valid instrumental variables. 
C. Analysis of Empirical Results 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0. 
The Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all variables included in the empirical 
study, covering 11 oil-abundant MENA countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014. As 
can be readily seen from this data, GDP has an average of 1.126 and a maximum value of 
104.657, reflecting that there are certainly large regional differences in growth rates. Also, the 
average of oil rents is 32.26 and its maximum value is 68.851, indicating that most MENA oil 
exporters are heavily dependent on oil export revenues. Whilst, the average diversification 
index of 0.7731 confirms that the blind reliance on oil remains the economic mainstay of 
MENA oil-exporting economies; further, this poor diversification is blamed for today’s growth 
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in the region. While, governance index (GI) has a mean value of -0.4079, reflecting that the 
region as a whole performs poorly in terms of governance. 
Table 3. Regression Results for 11 Oil-Abundant MENA countries 
 
Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0. 
The Table 3 reports the results of three different estimation techniques: pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models. All explanatory variables tend to have statistically 
significant coefficients with the expected signs in all regression, except the diversification index 
and governance index that appear to be insignificant in the random effects model, indicating 
that the triptych diversification-governance-oil rents has a crucial role to play in maintaining 
sound economic growth. Thus, the choice between fixed and random effects models will be 
made based on the Hausman test. 
Table 4. Hausman Test 
 
Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0. 
The Hausman chi-square test statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance (Prob (0.0404 < 0.05)) (see Table 4), then the null hypothesis is rejected in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis, in other words the Hausman test shows that the fixed effects model 
is the appropriate one, so we focus on it in this empirical study. On this basis, it is concluded 
that diversification, good governance and oil rents strengthen the foundation on which MENA 
oil exporters’ sustainable growth can be built. In order to examine the main symptoms of the 
resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant MENA countries, we estimated several models 
shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Regression Results for 11 Oil-Abundant MENA countries 
 
Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0. 
Results for each of the seven models are presented in the Table 5; MENA oil exporters’ 
growth is greatly and positively influenced by oil rents that can serve as a crucial funding source 
for many other sectors (see column (a)). The fixed effect OLS regression in column (b) reveals 
that oil rents exhibit a statistically significant positive effect on economic growth at the 5% 
level of significance, while most of the other explanatory variables (agriculture, industry, and 
services) have statistically insignificant coefficients with unexpected signs, and this can be 
explained by the fact that the oil sector leaves no room for investing in the other non-oil sectors. 
Column (c) indicates a positive and highly significant effect of oil rents on diversification index 
(in other words, higher oil rents leads to poor diversification, since a high diversification score 
indicates a low level of diversification), because oil rents encourage seeking a piece of the 
resource pie instead of engaging in productive activities, and they are strong enough to keep 
the doors locked in front of diversification strategies. As shown in column (d), concentration 
appears to be strongly positively influenced by oil rents that act as a powerful magnet for rent-
seeking activities. Based on the results in column (e), oil rents carry the expected positive sign 
with high significance, whilst most of the other explanatory variables (agriculture, industry, and 
services) maintain statistically insignificant coefficients with unexpected signs, reflecting that 
the dependence on oil rents causes the concentration of economic activity in oil-rich MENA 
countries. Column (f) shows that there is a negative association between oil rents and 
governance, highlighting the fact that the overwhelming reliance on oil rents generates a poor 
governance framework, which in turn frustrates efforts at economic diversification. The results 
in the column (g) illustrates that economic freedom is significantly adversely affected by oil 
rents, since these oil revenues make building high-quality economic institutions more arduous. 
On the basis of these findings, it is concluded that MENA oil exporters have been diagnosed 
with resource curse. In order to examine the role of governance in avoiding the resource curse 
in oil-abundant MENA countries, strengthening the foundation on which economic 
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diversification can be built, and turning oil rents into a tool for diversifying the economy, we 
estimated several models (shown in Table 6) in which each governance indicator was analyzed 
separately for avoiding the problems of interdependence or collinearity between governance 
indicators. 
Table 6. Regression Results for 11 Oil-Abundant MENA countries 
 
 Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0. 
The fixed effects GMM estimation results for each of the eight models are presented in 
the Table 6; governance index is negatively and significantly linked to the diversification index 
(see column (a)) (in other words, higher governance index leads to higher diversification, since 
a low diversification score indicates a high level of diversification), indicating that governance 
is a key ingredient in the diversification recipe. Likewise, oil rents display a significant positive 
impact on diversification index in 11 oil-rich MENA countries, and this is consistent with 
theory, that highlights the influential role of oil rents in encouraging rent-seeking activities and 
frustrating economic diversification. The multiplicative interaction term between governance 
index and oil rents yields a significant negative coefficient, implying that the combined effect 
of governance and oil rents is effective in promoting diversification; further, this term is strong 
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enough to overcome the diversification-decreasing effect of oil rents, indicating that the 
enhancement of MENA oil exporters’ governance situation allows oil rents to serve as a crucial 
funding source for many other sectors and enhance economic diversification. It is also worth 
noting that the validity of our instruments is confirmed, because the Hansen J-statistic of over 
identifying restrictions is insignificant (J-statistic p-value = 0.07413 >0.05) and therefore the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected. As shown in column (b), governance 
index is broken down into six indicators in order to figure out which of those indicators matter 
the most for economic diversification; the diversification index appears to be strongly 
negatively influenced by voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, and 
control corruption, hence, these four pillars support a diversification away from over-reliance 
on oil in MENA oil exporters. Column (c) reports the fixed effects GMM estimation results 
using the multiplicative interaction term between ‘voice and accountability’ and oil rents, this 
term yields a highly significant negative coefficient, indicating that the combined effect of 
‘voice and accountability’ and oil rents is effective in  boosting efforts to diversify oil-rich 
economies in the MENA region, because voice and accountability can ensure the pursuit of the 
public interest and prevent resource-rent dissipation by monitoring those in authority and 
holding them accountable and thus economic diversification can be initiated and guided. As 
shown in column (d), the multiplicative interaction term between political stability and oil rents 
yields a significant negative coefficient, reflecting that the joint impact of political stability and 
oil rents is effective in boosting economic diversification, because political stability and 
absence of violence induce politicians' tendency towards the efficient use of oil rents, thus 
laying the basis for economic diversification, they also create and maintain a favorable 
environment in which non-oil sectors can flourish. Based on the results in column (e), the 
multiplicative interaction term between government effectiveness and oil rents carries the 
expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5-percent level, implying that the 
combined effect of ‘government effectiveness’ and oil rents is of paramount importance in 
accelerating diversification, because government effectiveness enables MENA oil-exporters to 
wisely use oil rents in a way that can substantially contribute to the economic diversification 
by enhancing the ability of civil servants to deliver quality public services and requiring them 
to implement good oil management policies according to diversification requirements. Column 
(f) shows that there is a negative significant association between the multiplicative interaction 
term (RQ*OILR) and diversification index, this can be explained by the fact that the presence 
of regulatory quality makes it easier for oil-rich MENA governments to pursue market-friendly 
policies and avoid excessive regulatory burdens, thereby further heightening diversification and 
leaving oil sector in private hands. Column (g) illustrates that the relationship between the 
multiplicative interaction term (RL*OILR) and diversification index is negative and significant 
at the 10 percent level, since the rule of law curtails the ruling elite's attempt to use oil rents to 
further their own interests and leaves room for diversification through contributing to a more 
business- and citizen-friendly environment. A quick glance at the column (h) reveals that 
control of corruption protects oil rents from the ravenous behavior of bad politicians, and 
improves the management of oil rents and hence it can best serve the diversification process, 
because the multiplicative interaction term (CC*OILR) is highly statistically significant and 
has the expected sign. It is also worth noting that the validity of our instruments in eight models 
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is confirmed, since the Hansen J-statistic of over identifying restrictions is insignificant in each 
model and therefore the null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected. 
 In a nutshell, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’ good governance capabilities is 
the way out of the resource curse because it is the only mediator that can reconcile the twin 
goals of diversifying economic activity and yielding benefits from oil endowment, hence 
turning oil wealth into a boon, or more simply put, the building up of good governance can 
offer these oil-abundant countries more opportunities for economic diversification and give 
them much greater immunity to resource trap and thereby can enable them to generate robust 
and sustainable economic growth. 
V. Conclusion 
The present paper aims, on the one hand, to test the impact of oil rents on economic 
growth and examine the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant 
MENA countries, and on the other hand, to investigate the role of governance in avoiding the 
resource curse and turning oil rents into a tool for economic diversification in 11 MENA oil 
exporters (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014, by using pooled OLS, fixed effects, random 
effects and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The main findings indicate that 
the triptych oil rents-governance- diversification has a crucial role to play in maintaining sound 
economic growth. Oil rents exhibit a statistically significant positive effect on economic 
growth, while most of the other explanatory variables (agriculture, industry, and services) have 
statistically insignificant coefficients with unexpected signs, and this can be explained by the 
fact that the oil sector leaves no room for investing in the other non-oil sectors. Further, the 
dependence on oil rents keeps the doors locked in front of diversification strategies and causes 
the concentration of economic activity. The results also show that the overwhelming reliance 
on oil rents generates a poor governance framework and makes building high-quality economic 
institutions more arduous. On the basis of these findings, it is concluded that MENA oil 
exporters have been diagnosed with resource curse. Thus, it can be said that the composition of 
fiscal adjustment that matters most in avoiding future bottlenecks reveals a strong tilt toward 
retrenching, to some extent, current spending, while maintaining high-return public capital 
expenditures and priority social spending. Indeed, stepping up strenuous efforts to implement 
trade facilitation, broaden the region's export base, and develop a highly competitive and 
dynamic business environment, and strengthening the private sector's employment- absorptive 
capacity, will provide oil-rich MENA countries with greater insulation from the resource curse. 
Further, the fixed effects GMM estimation results reveal that governance is a key 
ingredient in the diversification recipe, while, oil rents frustrate economic diversification by 
encouraging rent-seeking activities. The multiplicative interaction term between governance 
index and oil rents indicates that the combined effect of these two variables is effective in 
promoting diversification, in other words, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’ 
governance situation allows oil rents to serve as a crucial funding source for many other sectors 
and enhance economic diversification. Moreover, economic diversification appears to be 
strongly positively influenced by voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, 
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and control corruption, and hence these four pillars support a diversification away from over-
reliance on oil in MENA oil-exporters. To sum up, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’ 
good governance capabilities is the way out of the resource curse because it is the only mediator 
that can reconcile the twin goals of diversifying economic activity and yielding benefits from 
oil endowment, hence turning oil wealth into a boon, or more simply put, the building up of 
good governance can offer these oil-abundant countries more opportunities for economic 
diversification and give them much greater immunity to resource trap and thereby can enable 
them to generate robust and sustainable economic growth. 
Oil-abundant MENA countries must change track to ride the wave of prosperity and attain 
robust and sustainable growth rates by focusing on economic diversification and enhancing 
good governance. In pursuit of these goals, policy makers should take into account that the first 
step in embarking on promising diversification processes is to build a thoughtful and 
measurable plan with realistic, clearly defined, and action-oriented goals, and it's worth 
mentioning that this plan should be executable. It's also worth bearing in mind that deeply 
entrenched governance issues in most MENA oil exporters cannot be solved overnight; visible 
and tangible improvements in governance are going to take time, they may sound simple, but 
they require long-term commitment and great efforts on everyone's part, this laborious process 
can bring fruitful results to each country engaged in such endeavor only if it is not carried out 
on a one-size-fits-all basis, and last but not least, it is extremely important to realize that 
insisting on change for the better and stepping up strenuous efforts to enhance the quality and 
effectiveness of education can ensure that future generations will be sufficiently vigilant in 
safeguarding their rights and shielding their economies against potentially damaging shocks. 
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